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Abstract. Riding too many horses at the same time without having identified in the first 
place the precise direction to follow cannot bring the rider very far. Yet this is what might happen 
in the field of Internet intermediaries’ liability if the initial premises as well as their implications 
are not made clearer at the policy level and if the legal rules meant to implement them are not 
construed accordingly and consistently when applied in practice on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, 
three  (and not one) rationales can be extracted from the text of the Directive on e-commerce and 
its provisions regarding the liability of intermediary providers: securing freedom of expression, 
encouraging content regulation the initiative of which should come from Internet intermediaries as 
well as promoting the growth of the single digital market by subsidizing private actors having a 
key role in the innovation process; hence, the dilemma of Internet intermediaries’ liability and the 
re-emergence of divergences at Member state level. In an attempt to clarify the terms of the 
debate, the purpose of this article is therefore to deconstruct the European system of liability 
exemptions for Internet intermediaries and shed light upon its fundamental assumptions and 
corollaries in order to appraise the appropriateness of the solutions that have recently been adopted 
both at supra-national and national levels.  
1. Acceptability and Justification of Copyright Law 
While the US Secretary of State was giving a speech in a conference on digital freedom sponsored by Google 
and the Dutch government warning the audience that restrictions on the Internet threatened fundamental 
freedoms and human rights as well as international commerce and more generally the free flow of information1, 
the Committee of the judiciary of the US House of representatives was preparing to conduct a hearing2 on the 
“Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA)3 presented as a necessary tool in order to modernize US criminal and civil 
statutes to meet new IP enforcement challenges and protect American jobs. If adopted, the SOPA would make at 
the disposal of right holders several tracks to combat piracy in the digital world and in particular would allow 
them to require through the means of complying notifications two types of intermediaries (payment network 
service providers4 and internet advertising services5) to take technically feasible and reasonable measures, as 
expeditiously as possible, either to prevent US users to complete transactions with or provide advertisements to 
Internet sites that are dedicated to theft of U.S. property6. The purpose of this chapter is not to comment upon the 
state of US law -although it is certainly useful to compare European and US law. It is interesting to note once  
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again that the protection and promotion of free speech is advocated simultaneously with the involvement of 
Internet intermediaries7 in the fight against piracy.  
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, Internet intermediaries have long been deemed key actors of the single 
digital market. But because fundamental competing interests are at stake and need to be balanced and because 
striking the balance was beyond the ambition of the drafters of the Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic 
commerce8, it is audacious to infer one univocal ratio legis from this legislative instrument even if it must be 
read together with the Directive2001/29/EC on copyright in the information society9 (the infosoc Directive) and 
the Directive 2004/48/EC on enforcement of intellectual property rights10.This explains in part why the European 
legal framework lies upon at least one central dilemma: how can one promote freedom of expression while 
expecting Internet intermediaries to take the initiative to police their systems or networks and in particular to 
react upon infringements of Intellectual Property (IP) rights. 
  
In its analysis of the application of the Directive on enforcement in the Member States the EU Commission 
stressed at the end of 2010 that  
 
“[i]n many cases, (…) intermediaries (…) have adopted comprehensive policies on the 
protection of intellectual property rights which are clearly spelled out on their sites. These 
policies include sanctions for users which breach the rules, in particular for the repeat 
infringers, comprehensive notice and take-down processes and other tools that allow a timely 
elimination of illegal offers, the sharing of information with rightholders and reimbursement 
schemes for consumers who unintentionally bought counterfeit goods on their site. All these 
measures have been applied without affecting the liability status of the intermediaries and have 
significantly contributed towards the elimination of counterfeiting on the Internet”11.  
 
Although it may be true that the policing by Internet intermediaries of their systems or networks has 
contributed towards the elimination of counterfeiting on the Internet, the foregoing affirmation appears to be a 
bold statement in the light of the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU): when it 
comes to the liability regimes of Internet intermediaries the European legal framework is much more intricate. 
This is true for at least two reasons. First it is not sure that the current solutions have been adopted to give 
Internet intermediaries incentives to take the initiative to police their networks and systems. This is all the more 
true that it has been argued that the right and ability to control the activities of one’s users are considered  
 
                                                          
7
 Internet intermediaries can perform a variety of activities which range from providing access to the Internet itself to offering 
tools to locate information or to organize and communicate information to others. This is from the perspective of end users. 
From the perspective of public authorities seeking to enrol Internet intermediaries as proxy censors the category of Internet 
intermediaries is potentially very rich as explained by SETH F. KREIMER, Censorship by proxy: the first Amendment, Internet 
intermediaries, and the problem of the weakest link, 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2006). at 16-17. 
Consequently any type of direct electronic link between end users or providers of ancillary services, which make Internet 
access effective, such as payment network service providers, as well as service providers offering directories, may be relied 
upon.  
8
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce'), OJ L 178, 
17.7.2000, p. 1–16.  
9
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167, 22.06.2001, p. 10 –19. 
10
 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, OJ L 157, 30.4.2004, p. 45–86.  
11
 Analysis of the application of Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the Member 
States (SEC(2010) 1589) p. 15. This understanding has however paved the way to the use of soft law rather than hard law to 
deal with the problem of Internet intermediaries ‘liability as the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding on the sale 
of counterfeit goods over the Internet. On 4 May 2011 the European Commission has encouraged stakeholders including anti-
counterfeiting organizations, leading right holders and trade associations and Internet platforms such as Amazon and eBay 
sign a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding to help reduce the sale of counterfeits via e-commerce platforms.  
See  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/stakeholders_dialogues_en.htm. 
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sufficient to prevent Internet intermediaries to avail of liability exemptions in order to make sure that they act as 
neutral carriers of information and do not restrain freedom of expression.  Second, assuming the protection of 
property rights and in particular intellectual property rights as a fundamental value should override the defence 
of freedom of expression -so that in cases of doubt it would be more appropriate to take down contentious 
contents than to make them accessible and it would be justified to prevent the distribution of technologies 
massively used to infringe even if not exclusively - this does not necessarily mean that the costs of implementing 
self-regulatory mechanisms should be borne by the intermediaries themselves. What is the difference in practice 
between exempting someone from financial liability, which implies that he should not be called upon to pay 
monetary compensation in case of damage, and enjoining someone to implement pricy technological measures to 
monitor and ultimately regulate the activities of its subscribers, users, before holding him financially liable? In  
other words obliging Internet intermediaries to self-regulate their systems or networks could have adverse effects 
both on freedom of expression and innovation in the digital market.                                                                     
 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to deconstruct the European system of liability exemptions for 
Internet intermediaries to shed light upon its fundamental assumptions and the different rationale that have been 
put forward to justify its precise existence in order to appraise the appropriateness of the solutions that have been 
adopted both at supra-national and national levels. Even though the Directive on e-commerce has been largely 
commented and in particular its implications in terms of Internet intermediaries’ liability12 the recent 
interpretation by the CJEU of some of its key provisions in cases involving IP violations is the occasion to see 
whether the Court has managed to come up with a coherent body of rules and how large the leeway that remains 
for Member States is.  
 
Three and not one rationale can be extracted from the text of the Directive on e-commerce and its provisions 
regarding the liability of intermediary providers: securing freedom of expression, encouraging content regulation 
at the initiative of Internet intermediaries as well as feeding the growth of the single digital market making sure 
that service providers including Internet intermediaries are not prevented from developing innovative 
applications. The difficulty is to understand the precise implications of each rationale in terms of Internet 
intermediaries’ liability in order to be able assess their strength in the light of judicial interpretations both at 
European and national levels. The European legal framework for the liability of internet intermediaries will thus 
be examined from three distinct angles to determine whether the balance stricken between these regulatory 
objectives is appropriate in the field of intellectual property and in particular in the field of copyright.  
                                                          
12 See e.g. PATRICK VAN EECKE & BARBARA OOMS, ISP liability and the e-commerce directive: a growing trend toward 
greater responsability for ISPs, 11 Journal of Internet Law 3(2007);CYRIL VAN DER NET, Civil liability of Internet providers 
following the Directive on electronic commerce, in E-commerce law -National transposition and transnational topics and 
perspectives (Henk Snijders & Stephen Weatherill eds. 2003);E. CRABIT, La directive sur le commerce électronique, 4 Revue 
du Droit de l'Union Européenne 749(2000);LILIAN  EDWARDS, Articles 12-15 ECD: ISP Liability -The Problem of 
Intermediary Service Provider Liability, in The new legal framework for e-commerce in Europe (Lilian Edwards ed. 
2005);BENOÎT FRYDMAN & ISABELLE RORIVE, Regulating Internet content through intermediaries in Europe and the USA, 23 
Revue de l'Institut Max Planck de Cologne 41(2002);R. JULIA-BARCELO, On-line intermediary liability issues: comparing 
E.U. and U.S. legal framework, 22 European Intellectual Property Review 105(2000);AURELIO LOPEZ-TARRUELLA, A 
European community regulatory framework for electronic commerce, 38 Commun Market Law Review 
1337(2001);VICTORIA MCEVEDY, The DMCA and the e-commerce Directive, 24 European Intellectual Property Review 
63(2002);ETIENNE MONTERO, La responsabilité des prestataires intermédiaires sur les réseaux, in Le commerce électronique 
sur les rails? Analyse et proposition de mise en oeuvre de la directive sur le commerce électronique (Etienne Montero ed. 
2001);LUCA TIBERI & MICHELE ZAMBONI, Liability of service providers, 9 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 
49(2003);LILIAN EDWARDS, The fall and rise of intermediary liability online, in Law and the Internet (Lilian Edwards & C. 
Waelde eds., 2009). More recently see ETIENNE MONTERO & QUENTIN VAN ENIS, Enabling freedom of expression in light of 
filtering measures imposed on Internet intermediaries: Squaring the circle?, 27 Computer law & Security Review 
21(2011);PATRICK VAN EECKE, Online service providers and liability: a plea for a balanced approach, 48 Common Market 
Law Review 1455(2011). 
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2. The first rationale: to secure freedom of expression 
The first rationale that can be extracted from the wording of the Directive on e-commerce is the will to secure 
freedom of expression. Such a rationale if consistently pursued would have three fundamental implications: the 
exemption of passive intermediaries, the obligation for hosting providers to react upon manifestly unlawful 
content in a calibrated manner and the prohibition for law-makers to force Internet intermediaries to appreciate 
the lawfulness of contents transmitted or stored on their systems or networks and subsequently take enforcement 
measures to eliminate allegedly unlawful contents. Although this rationale has recently found echo in case law 
and in particular at the European level it is doubtful whether it has been endorsed by a majority both at national 
and supra-national levels.  
2.1 The exemption of passive intermediaries   
In contrast with what has been laid down by the US federal legislator in 1998, the European Union seems to have 
favoured a horizontal system of liability exemptions to govern the activities of Internet intermediaries, namely 3 
types of activities13: mere conduits14, caching15 and hosting16. The liability exemptions contained in section 4 of 
the Directive on e-commerce entitled “Liability of intermediary service providers” do apply irrespective of the 
nature of the violation at issue. These exemptions have thus been carved out to make sure that whatever the 
interest impaired17 when unlawful information is transmitted by third parties on intermediary providers’ systems 
or networks the latter are made liable only in limited circumstances.  
 
To start with the broad picture, the Directive on e-commerce is the European response to the adoption by the 
US federal legislator of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 199818, the DMCA coming after the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 199619. Although the Directive on e-commerce builds upon the German 
Multimedia Act of 199720, it has clearly been influenced by the drafting of the DMCA21. With this perspective in 
mind, when one looks carefully at the wording of the Directive on e-commerce it is possible to pull out at least 
three distinct rationale. But even when one includes the recitals and the travaux préparatoires of the Directive, it 





                                                          
13
 The activity of providers of information location tools has consciously been forgotten.  
14
 See Article 12 of the Directive on e-commerce. 
15
 See Article 13 of the Directive on e-commerce. 
16
 See Article 14 of the Directive on e-commerce. 
17
 Be it economic such as those protected by IP or consumer law or non-economic such as those protected by IP law or 
defamation or privacy torts.  
18
 DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT, PL 105-304 (HR 2281) 28 October 1998 as codified in 17 U.S.C. §512. 
See Recital 60 of the Directive on e-commerce: “In order to allow the unhampered development of electronic commerce, the 
legal framework must be clear and simple, predictable and consistent with the rules applicable at international level so that 
it does not adversely affect the competitiveness of European industry or impede innovation in that sector”. 
19
 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 PL 104-104 (S 652) 8 February 1996 as codified in 47 U.S.C. §230. See 
Recital 60 of the Directive on e-commerce: “In order to allow the unhampered development of electronic commerce, the 
legal framework must be clear and simple, predictable and consistent with the rules applicable at international level so that 
it does not adversely affect the competitiveness of European industry or impede innovation in that sector”. 
20
 For comments upon the German Multimedia Statute of 1997 see e.g. T. Jansen, Legal aspects of doing e-commerce 
business in Germany, International Company and Commercial Law Review 1999, 39-42 ;K. BURMEISTER and C. KOHLER, 
Copyright liability on the Internet today in Europe (Germany, France, Italy and the E.U.), 21 European Intellectual Property 
Review 485(1999); R. JULIA-BARCELO, Liability for on-line intermediaries: a European perspective, 20 European Intellectual 
Property Review 453(1998). 
21
 See e.g. FRYDMAN & RORIVE;JULIA-BARCELO, On-line intermediary liability issues: comparing E.U. and U.S. legal 
framework. 
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The first rationale is the one openly adopted by the Advocate General Maduro in Google France et Inc. v 
Louis Vuitton Malletier SA et al 22, which relies essentially upon Recital 42 of the Directive on e-commerce 
despite the fact that Recital 42 does seem to concern only mere conduits and caching providers to the exclusion 
of hosting providers23: “The exemptions from liability established in this Directive cover only cases where the 
activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and giving 
access to a communication network over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or 
temporarily stored, for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere 
technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither 
knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored”. In the words of Maduro in 
Google v Vuitton: “the aim of Directive 2000/31 is to create a free and open public domain on the internet”24. 
 
Although the CJEU does not expressly refer to the need to guarantee the free flow of information in the 
digital world, it held twice that “that the exemptions from liability established in that directive cover only cases 
in which the activity of the information society service provider is ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive  
nature’, which implies that that service provider ‘has neither knowledge of nor control over the information 
which is transmitted or stored’”25. One could thus think that the Court adheres to Maduro’s approach.  
 
Truly the CJEU’s reasoning appears to some extent to be tautological. The Court seems to distinguish two 
different questions: whether the service provider is an intermediary provider in the sense of the Directive and 
whether the intermediary provider can avail of the liability exemption set forth in Article 14. Yet it uses the same 
criteria to answer both questions: knowledge or control over the data transmitted. Consequently one may argue 
that the first question is of little interest and that in the end the CJEU has a relatively broad understanding of the 
category of hosting providers26, which would include some active service providers.  
 
Nevertheless, because the CJEU uses two alternative criteria to delineate the contours of the domain of 
Article 1427, it does give independent consideration to the nature of the technological architecture set up by 
Internet intermediaries irrespective of proof of actual knowledge or awareness, which implies that Article 14 will 
not be able to shelter a certain number of active service providers. To be more precise the CJEU appears to be 
reluctant to consider that service providers developing means to enhance the capabilities of their users without 
taking precautionary measures to reduce infringing activities can effectively be shielded by Article 14. Truly, in 
L’Oréal v eBay the CJEU ultimately ruled that it was for the national court to determine whether the defendant 
had provided assistance to primary infringers, the proof of which would be established if the defendant was 
helping its subscribers to optimise the presentation of their offers for sale or was promoting those offers28. But 
the CJEU did indicate that the sole proof of assistance shall suffice to deprive the service provider of the benefit 
of Article 14.  
 
 
                                                          
22
 Opinion of Advocate General Poires Maduro delivered on 22 September 2009, C-236/08, C-237/08, C-238/08, Google 
France et Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, Viaticum SA, Luteciel SARL, CNRRH (Maduro’s opinion in Google v 
Vuitton).  
23
 This is the reason why Maduro’s position has been criticized by several commentators. See e.g. VAN EECKE, Online service 
providers and liability: a plea for a balanced approach.  
24
 Maduro’s opinion in Google v Vuitton, § 142. 
25
 CJEU, 23 March 2010, C-236/08, C-237/08, C-238/08, Google France et Inc. c/ Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, Viaticum SA, 
Luteciel SARL, CNRRH §113  (Google v Vuitton) ; CJEU, 12 July 2011, C-324/09, L’Oréal SA et al v eBay International 
AG et al §113 (L’Oréal v eBay).  In L’Oréal v eBay the CJEU stated that ″where a service provider, instead of confining 
itself to providing that service neutrally by a merely technical and automatic processing of the data provided by its customers 
plays an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control, those data” it is an intermediary provider within the 
meaning of the Directive on e-commerce. 
26
 §118 of L’Oréal v eBay does show nonetheless that these questions are conceived as two distinct questions by the Court.  
27
 In the US these criteria are cumulative and not alternative. In other words control over data is not enough to make a hosting 
provider loose the benefit of the safe harbour and ultimately make him liable.  
28
 The CJEU does recognize that in some cases eBay provides assistance intended to optimise or promote certain offers for 
sale. L’Oréal v eBay § 114. 
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Assuming the right path is that followed by Maduro - which as aforementioned is not necessarily the 
standpoint adopted by the CJEU, which may opine in the future that even if intermediary providers exercise 
some degree of control over the data transmitted on their systems or networks what matters is whether they have 
taken adequate precautionary measures to reduce infringement - all the liability exemptions set forth in the 
Directive on e-commerce comprising the one sheltering hosting providers should be considered as a means to 
guarantee the free flow of information: they would thereby constitute an indirect protection of freedom of 
expression29. 
 
At this stage it is important to note that if the criterion of control was to be interpreted loosely innovation in 
the digital market could be seriously impaired without one really gaining anything on the side of freedom of 
expression. Even more less innovation would be likely to mean fewer platforms on which users would be able to 
communicate and exchange ideas and opinion.  
 
Maduro does seem to have a very narrow understanding of the category of passive intermediary providers 
qualified as neutral. In his words “[i]nformation society services will rarely consist in activities which are 
exclusively technical, and will normally be associated with other activities which provide their financial 
support”30. As a result only few service providers would be able to show that they remain neutral as regards the 
information they carry or host. Mere conduits within the Directive on e-commerce would the best illustration. To 
give a further example, while the natural search engine service supplied by Google seems to easily pass the 
test31, it should not be the case for the paying referencing system “Adwords” run by the same undertaking32. 
More generally, Web 2.0 service providers and in particular operators of electronic marketplaces such as eBay 
would have a difficult time to meet this requirement since it could easily be argued that they have an interest in 
bringing specific contents to the internet user’s attention. This would certainly be the case if the inclusion of 
advertisings on webpages the content of which originates from users would suffice to make intermediary 
providers lose the benefit of the hosting exemption.  
 
Nonetheless it may well be that neither Maduro nor the CJEU are ready to go that far nor, that national 
decisions that have adopted this line of reasoning should be condemned33. Under the CJEU’s decision in the 




                                                          
29
 Indirect rather than direct form of protection of free expression are likely to become the norm in the digital age as 
explained by Balkin which sees the CDA as an indirect form of free expression. J.M. BALKIN, The future of free expression in 
a digital age, 36 Pepperdine Law Review 427(2009). This said it is not clear whether one should in all cases welcome such 
legislative interventions in particular as regards the CDA itself.  
30
 Maduro’s opinion in Google v Vuitton, §140. 
31
 Besides seach engines or providers of location tools in certain Member States have been deemed as performing a function 
similar to that of mere conduits and therefore their liability regime has been modelled on the rules set forth mere conduits.; 
Federal Act on certain aspects of electronic commerce and legal transactions [2001] Bundesgesetzblatt (Österriech) I 1977 
(21 December 2001) in Austria. See also the description of the services provided by Google in Metropolitan International 
Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp. [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB) in the UK although the Court does not apply any exemption 
originating from the Directive on e-commerce.  
32
 Maduro’s opinion in Google v Vuitton, §146. Interestingly in a decision postdating Google v Vuitton a French tribunal of 
first instance has held in a defamation case that the implementation of the Google suggest function was enough to deprive the 
search engine from its status of neutral intermediary provider. TGI, 8 September 2010, M. X… v Google Inc., Eric S. et 
Google France, http://www.legalis.net./ 
33
 See for example in France CA Paris, 4e ch., A, 7 June 2006, Tiscali Media v Dargaud Lombard, Lucky Comics, 
www.legalis.net; TGI Paris, réf., 22 June 2007, Lambert v Sté Myspace, www.legalis.net. More recent decisions follow the 
CJEU’s ruling. See CA Paris, pole 1, ch. 5, 13 October 2010, Roland Magdane et autres v Dailymotion, 
http://www.legalis.net./  ; CA Paris 14 April 2010 Omar S. et autres v Dailymotion, www.legalis.net; and Cass, Civ 1, 17 
February 2011, Nord-Ouest Production v Dailymotion, http://www.legalis.net./ which contradicts its previous decision in the 
case Cass, Civ 1, 14 January 2010 Sté Telecom Italia (anciennement Sté Tiscali) v Sté Dargaud Lombard et Sté Lucky 
Comics, www.legalis.net although the latter has been issued on the ground of a text that had  been adopted to anticipate the 
Directive on e-commerce but which has then been abrogated.  
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provider sets the payment terms or that it provides general information to its clients shall not have the effect of 
depriving Google of the exemptions from liability provided for in the Directive on e-commerce.34  
 
What is the real issue for the sake of securing freedom of expression is not so much the fact that intermediary 
providers derive streams of revenues from the utilization of their services by their subscribers but the fact that 
they set the selection of contents accessible to their users in a discriminatory and opaque manner, in particular in 
relation to the nature of the message conveyed35. This does not mean that all Internet intermediaries who act 
none discriminatorily and transparently do not make choice as regards the type of contents that will ultimately 
render accessible to their users. In this sense they are not neutral. Yet it is arguable to state that providing 
assistance to help certain power sellers to optimise or promote certain offers for sale should be condemned in so 
far as it amounts to treating differently similar contents. But this tends to be considered as an illegitimate free-
riding despite its loose tie with the protection of freedom of expression. By way of example, a French Court of 
appeal held after in 2010 after the CJEU’s decision in the case Google v Vuitton that eBay’s services were not 
purely technical, automatic and passive and thereby the service provider could not avail of the liability 
exemption deriving from the transposition of the Directive on e-commerce36. The same could be said as regards 
paying referencing services, which in principle rely upon an objective criterion to select contents: the amount of 
money the advertiser is willing to pay. To what extent this criterion could be used by all intermediaries and in 
particular Internet access providers is another problem. The concept of discriminatory treatment can thus only be 
relative and its implications should vary in relation to the nature of the service provided. In any cases, social 
networking websites and streaming platforms37 should be in a better position than operators of electronic 
marketplaces. 
                                                          
34
 In the same vein, concordance between the keyword selected and the search term entered by an internet user is not 
sufficient of itself to justify the view that the intermediary provider has knowledge of, or control over, the data entered into 
its system by advertisers and stored in memory on its server. Google v Vuitton, §117.  
35
 It could be convincingly claimed that certain intermediaries should be able to treat differently similar contents namely 
those which do not perform a function similar to that of a public utility or which are not in a dominant position. Depending 
upon the size of the community they reach and their market position this could be the case of administrators of forum for 
example. 
36
 CA Reims, 20 July 2010, eBay France et International v Hermès International, Cindy F., www.legalis.net. In France the 
least consensual status is that of operators of electronic marketplaces. See before the decision of Reims Court of appeal, TGI 
Paris, 3e ch., 26 October 2004, SA Poiray France, Mme N. H. v SARL CJSF, SARL Comptoir de Joaillerie de service de 
fabrication, SARL Orphelie, SA Ibazar, SA Ebay France, www.juriscom.net ; CA Paris, 9 November 2007, eBay v S.A.R.L. 
DWC, www.juriscom.net ; T. com. Brest, réf., 6 August 2008, Quai Ouest Musiques v eBay Europe, eBay International AG, 
www.legalis.net ; TI Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, 6 August 2003, Bruno Axelrad v eBay France S.A., Juris-Data n° 2003-
241976, Comm. Com. Electr. 2004, comm. 91, note Ph. Stoffel-Munck ; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 3e section, 13 May 2009, L’Oréal 
et autres v eBay France et autres  www.legalis.net (for only some of its activities). Compare with T. com., Paris, 1re ch., B, 
30 June 2008, Parfums Christian Dior et autres v eBay Inc., eBay International AG, www.legalis.net ; T. com., Paris, 1re ch., 
B, 30 June 2008, Christian Dior Coutures v eBay Inc., eBay International AG, www.legalis.net ; T. com., Paris, 1re ch., B, 30 
June 2008, Louis Vuitton Malletier v eBay Inc., eBay International AG, www.legalis.net ; TGI Troyes, 4 June 2008, Hermès 
International v Madame Cindy F, eBay France et eBay International, www.juriscom.net ; TGI Paris, 17e ch., 11 February 
2003, M. Timothy K. et Yahoo Inc. v Amicale des dép. d'Ausch. et des camps de H. Silésie et MRAP, www.juriscom.net. 
The French forum on Internet rights (Forum des droits de l’Internet) has recommended that operators of platforms that allow 
users to connect with others should be able to avail of the hosting exemption. Recommandation du Forum des droits de 
l’Internet ″Commerce électronique entre particuliers″ published on 8 November 2005, p. 13, www.foruminternet.org. 
37
 See for example in France TGI Paris, 3e ch., 2e section, 14 November 2008, Jean-Yves L. et  autres v Youtube et autres, 
www.legalis.net. Voir également CA Aix-en-Provence, 13 March 2006, Lucent Technologies v Escota, www.legalis.net ; 
TGI Paris, 3e ch., 2e section, 13 July 2007, Christian C., Nord Ouest Production v Dailymotion, UGC Images, 
www.legalis.net confirmed by CA Paris, 4e ch., A, 6 May 2009, Dailymotion v Nord-Ouest production et autres, 
www.legalis.net ; T. com. Paris, 20 February 2008, Flach Film et autres v Google France, Google Inc www.legalis.net ; TGI 
Paris, 3e ch., 1re section, 15 April 2008, Jean Yves Lafesse et autres v Dailymotion et autres, www.legalis.net ; TGI Paris, 3e 
ch., 1re section, 15 April 2008, Omar et Fred et autres v Dailymotion et autres, www.legalis.net ; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 1re 
section, 3 June 2008, Lafesse et autres v OVH et autres, www.legalis.net confirmed by CA Paris, Pôle 5, 2e ch., 11 December 
2009, Lafesse v OVH et autres, www.legalis.net ; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 2e section, 10 April 2009, SARL Zadig Productions v 
SA Dailymotion, www.legalis.net ; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 3e section, 13 May 2009, Temps Noir et autres v Youtube et autres 
www.legalis.net ; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 3e section, 24 June 2009, Jean-Yves Lafesse et autres v Google et autres www.legalis.net 
; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 2e section, 10 June 2009, Bayard Presse v YouTube LLC, www.legalis.net ; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 22 
September 2009, n° 09/06246, ADAMI et a. v Sté YouTube, www.juriscom.net. 
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As regards infringements of intellectual property rights, one of the main difficulties is to determine how the 
duality of infringements, in other words the distinction between primary and secondary infringement, impacts 
upon the way the liability exemptions must be interpreted. To be more precise, depending upon the way the 
interplay between primary and secondary infringement is conceived it is likely that passive intermediaries may 
be prevented from resorting to the liability exemptions at all. This would be the case if the domain of strict 
liability was to be stretched too far without any possibility of distinguishing between volitional behaviour and 
mere facilitation. To follow the logic of the US system of liability exemptions, safe harbours are meant to benefit 
secondary infringers and not primary infringers. Secondary infringers are those who either have contributed with 
knowledge to the realisation of a primary infringement38 or those who have derived financial benefit from a 
primary infringement with the right and ability to stop it39. If Internet intermediaries directly violate one of the 
exclusive rights of right holders without the need to establish beforehand the commission of an infringement by 
others they cannot avail of the safe harbours laid down in the DMCA40.  
 
In Europe, although the provisions of the Directive on e-commerce dealing with the liability of Internet 
intermediaries have been drafted negatively, the foregoing logic cannot really be used to interpret the scope of 
the exemptions laid down. As Maduro mentions it in Google v Vuitton, in most of the Member States there is no 
distinction between primary and secondary liability in the field of intellectual property41. Therefore to render 
these exemptions useful, and even if this does not seem to be inferred neither by the Advocate General nor by the 
CJEU in Google v Vuitton who do not need to in this particular case, the liability exemptions should apply even 
though the ground claim for is that of primary infringement in so far as the allegedly unlawful information has 
been transmitted or posted at the request of a third party42. Besides, in L’Oréal v eBay the CJEU seems to 
confirm this solution in fine by examining the status of the service provider in the light of the Directive on e-
commerce even though the latter could potentially be deemed a primary infringer.  
 
The interaction between the liability exemptions and the hypotheses of primary and secondary infringements 
has not always been dealt with in the same way at Member States level. In some cases the refusal to examine the 
applicability of these exemptions when theories of primary infringement have been successfully applied may 
render these exemptions pointless. In France although courts have had a difficult time trying to delineate the 
category of hosting providers43 they have agreed to address the question whether the defendant could avail of the 
liability exemptions in cases in which infringement had been characterized44. It is true nonetheless that the way  
                                                          
38
 This is the doctrine of contributory liability. See Gershwin Publ’g Co v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 
1162 (2nd Cir. 1971) (“One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a “contributory” infringer”.) 
39
 The is the doctrine of vicarious liability. See e.g. Fonovisa, Inc v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F. 3d 259, 264, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1590 (9th Cir. 1996) ; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004, 1022-1023 (9th Cir. 2001).  
40
 For an example see a case in which the display of thumbnail images has been considered as prima facie primary violation 
of the right but has considered to be justified on the ground of fair use. Perfect 10 Inc v Amazon.com Inc. 487 F3d 701 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
41
 Maduro’s opinion in Google v Vuitton, §48.  
42
 As a result, even though doctrines of secondary liability do not exist in the field of intellectual property in most of the 
Member states the implementation of liability exemptions will amount to the introduction of a distinction between primary 
infringers and secondary infringers. 
43
 The recent decision of the French Cassation Court should mark a turn towards a broader interpretation of the notion of 
hosting provider. Cass, Civ 1, 17 February 2011, Nord-Ouest Production v Dailymotion, http://www.legalis.net./ although in 
certain cases lower courts have been reluctant to exempt active hosting providers even after the Google v Vuitton case. See 
e.g. CA Paris, 14 January 2011, Google v Bac Films et al, http://www.legalis.net./ 
44
 See e.g. in the field of copyright CA Paris, 14 January 2011, Google v Bac Films et al, http://www.legalis.net./ ; TGI Paris, 
3e ch., 2e section, 9 October 2009, H & K, André R. v Google, www.legalis.net. Voir également TGI Paris, 3e ch., 
22 septembre 2009, n° 09/06246, ADAMI et a. v Sté YouTube, www.juriscom.net ; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 2e section, 18 
décembre 2009, Editions du Seuil et autres v Google Inc et France, www.legalis.net. In the field of trade marks see CA 
Versailles, 23 March 2006, Société Google France v S.A.R.L. CNRRH, www.gazettedunet.fr; TGI Nanterre, 2e ch., 14 
December 2004, CNRRH, Pierre Alexis T. v Google France et autres, www.legalis.net ; CA Paris, 4e ch., A, 28 June 2006, 
Google France v Louis Vuitton Malletier, www.legalis.net ; CA Aix en Provence, 2e ch., 6 December 2007, TWD Industries 
v Google France, Google Inc., www.juriscom.net ; TGI Paris, 14 March 2008, Citadines v Google Inc. et Google France, 
www.juriscom.net ; CA Paris, 4e ch., B, 1er February 2008, Gifam et a. v Google France, www.legalis.net;  CA Versailles, 
12e ch., 1, 2 November 2006, Overture v Acor, www.legalis.net ; TGI Nanterre, 1re ch., 2 March 2006, Hôtels Méridien v 
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the preliminary question had been drafted by the French Court of Cassation in Google v Vuitton is rather 
confusing since it does seem to imply that if the activity of the defendant falls within the monopoly of the 
claimant, it can never avail of Article 14 of the Directive on e-commerce45. In the UK when judges have held 
that the defendant was liable both on the ground of primary infringement and on the ground of joint and several 
liability they have not addressed the question of the applicability of liability exemptions46. This may become  
problematic when hypotheses of primary infringements are interpreted broadly as it is the case in Newzbin 1: 
while the infringing website is not directly responsible for the reproduction or transmission between users of 
protected works the Court does consider that by providing its facilities to its subscribers it violates the right to 
communicate the works to the public47. This said, even though the reasoning of the Court is objectionable the 
decision it ultimately reaches is not necessarily inappropriate: had the Court used a doctrine of secondary 
infringement similar to that of the doctrine of inducement applied by the US Supreme Court in the Grokster 
case48, the defendant would have been found liable anyway. 
 
Despite the rise of Internet intermediaries’ liability after the first years of clemency following the adoption of 
the Directive on e-commerce and its transposition at national level49, it would be unfair to state that the 
exemption laid down in favour of hosting providers has remained an empty shell. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that the protection of freedom of expression is the prevailing rationale as its furtherance has other radical 
implications that have not proved to be consensual. 
2.2 The obligation for hosting providers to adequately react upon manifestly unlawful content  
 
If securing freedom of expression was to be the prevailing rationale underlying the liability exemptions laid 
down in the Directive on e-commerce, this would have important implications at two other distinct stages: first 
when one would have to determine the type of contents that would trigger the reaction of Internet intermediaries 
and more precisely hosting providers, and, second when one would have to define the nature of the enforcement 
measures that these intermediaries could be required to implement. At this point, one thus understands that the 
construction of the knowledge requirement is less problematic than expected. In order to avoid that Internet 
intermediaries act as private censors one would need to limit the number of contents the presence of which 
would require the intervention of the service provider transmitting or hosting them. Only when contents would 
be manifestly unlawful- so that intermediaries would not have to appreciate their lawfulness-  would the latter be 
required to react and eventually take them down or restrict access to them.  
 
To make sure the adverb manifestly is taken seriously the best way to proceed would be to make the reaction 
of hosting providers depend upon a court order as it is the case in Spain50 or Finland51. Truly, the foregoing is not 
a sine qua non condition under the Directive and the CJEU in L’Oréal v eBay does reckon that actual knowledge  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Google France, www.legalis.net ; TGI Nanterre, 2e ch., 13 October 2003, Société Viaticum, Société Luteciel c/ Société 
Google France, www.legalis.net. 
45
 Google v Vuitton, §32. See in particular the third question posed by the Court of Cassation: “In the event that such use 
does not constitute a use which may be prevented by the trade mark proprietor under [Directive 89/104] or [Regulation 
No 40/94], may the provider of the paid referencing service be regarded as providing an information society service 
consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service, within the meaning of Article 14 of 
[Directive 2000/31], so that that provider cannot incur liability until it has been notified by the trade mark proprietor of the 
unlawful use of the sign by the advertiser?’”.  
46
 Newzbin 1. See the chapter on UK law.  
47
 Newzbin 1, §113 ff. 
48
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd. 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
49
 VAN EECKE & OOMS, ISP liability and the e-commerce directive: a growing trend toward greater responsability for ISP. 
EDWARDS, Articles 12-15 ECD: ISP Liability -The Problem of Intermediary Service Provider Liability.   EDWARDS, The fall 
and rise of intermediary liability online.   
50
 Law 34/2002 on Information Society Services and Electronic Commerce (11 July 2002) (B.O.E. of 12 July 2002). Some 
have thus criticized the defective implementation of the Directive on e-commerce in Spain.   
51
 As mentioned by the Advocate General in the case L’Oréal v eBay. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 9 
December 2010, C-324/09, L’Oréal SA et al v eBay International AG et al (Jääskinen Opinion in L’Oréal v eBay), §159. 
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or awareness on the part of the provider can be obtained “as the result of an investigation undertaken on its own 
initiative, an illegal activity or illegal information, as well as a situation in which the operator is notified of the 
existence of such an activity or such information”52. But this does not mean that Member States cannot make the 
intervention of the judiciary a necessary condition. 
 
In addition, one should not stop here. Not to chill freedom of expression judges would have to assess whether 
the enforcement measure that the addressee of the court order would be required to perform is in fact strictly 
tailored so that lawful contents are not targeted as well. This should constitute a significant hurdle for claimants 
although the broader issue of the effectiveness of the enforcement measure –whether the content provider is able 
to easily relocate the contents and make it accessible to users de nuovo in the jurisdiction at issue- would not 
really be of relevance here. As a consequence even if the contentious content would be deemed manifestly 
unlawful by a competent judge, the Internet intermediary would not be required to react if the implementation of 
the court order would have adverse effect on lawful contents. While the danger of overreaching injunctions have 
been stressed by many53, when confronted with this argument judges have not been very receptive. The recent 
French decision issued in the case Claude Guéant v Free et al is a perfect illustration.54 The French minister of 
the Interior was claiming for an injunction against several Internet access providers to make them take all the 
necessary measures to stop the diffusion of a website alleged to be offensive, defamatory and in violation of data 
protection law. Whereas the Tribunal acknowledges that imposing the blocking of the URL was not appropriate 
and proportionate, it did not hesitate to order the blocking of the entire website until final decision be issued on 
the matter at hand.  
 
Furthermore, because Internet intermediaries would be required to react only when contents are manifestly 
unlawful exempting them from liability when they take enforcement measures against lawful contents would not 
be necessary. Besides refusing to set forth Good Samaritan exemptions would tip the balance in favour of 
freedom of expression in the sense that it would give Internet intermediaries the incentive to remain still in case 
of doubts. By contrast the inclusion of Good Samaritan exemptions would work the other way around: it would 
send Internet intermediaries the message that reacting upon suspicious contents would be safe as long as they 
have reasonable doubts, i.e. as long as they act bona fide. The precise inexistence of a Good Samaritan rule in 
the Directive on e-commerce might be interpreted in favour of freedom of expression. But this may be stretching 
the intention of its drafters too far if one recalls that they were initially driven by a relatively modest 
harmonization project: to impact as little as possible upon the general rules of civil liability in place in Member 
states55. Yet the US CDA56 and DMCA57 do contain such exemptions. 
 
The corollary of the restrictive interpretation of the knowledge requirement is that intermediary providers 
should not appreciate the lawfulness of the contents transmitted or stored on their networks or systems. 
 
2.3 The prohibition to force intermediary providers to appreciate the lawfulness of contents  
Likewise, the prohibition of imposing a general obligation to monitor one’s network or system laid down in 
Article 15 of the Directive on e-commerce should be interpreted in the light of the prevailing rationale being as 
for now the protection of freedom of expression. In so far as one acknowledges the difference between standard-
setting, monitoring and enforcement, what should be prohibited through the means of Article 15 would be to 
force Internet intermediaries to set the standard for lawfulness and thereby accessibility of contents and 
implement overreaching enforcement measures targeting lawful contents.  
 
                                                          
52
 L’Oréal v eBay §122. 
53
 See for example MONTERO & VAN ENIS, Enabling freedom of expression in light of filtering measures imposed on Internet intermediaries: 
Squaring the circle;JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, Internet points of control, 14 Boston College Law Review 653(2003). 
54
 TGI Paris, réf., 14 October 2011, Claude Guéant v Free et al, www.legalis.net; See also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation et al v 




 §230(c)(2).  
57
 §512(g)(1).  
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    





Assuming the requested monitoring solely implies on the part of intermediaries the precise localisation of 
unlawful contents previously characterized by legitimate entities, freedom of expression would not be inherently 
jeopardized. This said, depending upon the way the monitoring is carried out, it may put at risk users’ anonymity 
and privacy. Yet, it is likely that the mere fact that surveillance mechanisms are set up will chill freedom of 
expression even though no sanction will automatically follow before judicial assessment.  
 
As we are going to see below this interpretation has not been endorsed neither by European judges nor by 
national judges. The reason is not so much that it would be too costly for Internet intermediaries to step in. 
Judges and law-makers after the adoption of the Directive on e-commerce have gradually abided by the 
“necessity” to encourage private regulation, which implies that Internet intermediary are obliged in certain cases 
not only to localise allegedly unlawful contents but also to appreciate their lawfulness and take appropriate 
enforcement measures. Generally speaking, other fundamental considerations have outweighed the protection of 
freedom of expression to make the protection of intellectual property interests effective while the urgency of the 
need to subsidize the ICT industry has progressively lost its strength.  
3. The second rationale: not to hinder private regulation  
The second rationale that can be inferred from the reading of the European provisions dealing with the liability 
of intermediary providers is the will to encourage private regulation more often called self-regulation undertaken 
at the initiative of the intermediary providers themselves. This rationale perceived in many cases as the best way 
to protect intellectual property interests in the digital world differs from the first rationale in two ways. First the 
domain of the exemptions should be broader and include passive as well as active intermediary providers who 
take the initiative to regulate contents on their networks or systems. Besides, even though the Directive on e-
commerce is silent on this point, the effects of these exemptions should be further enlarged and thereby cover 
intermediary providers when they take enforcement measures against lawful contents bona fide. Second, and this 
is true in particular in the field of intellectual property, active as well as passive intermediary providers should be 
called upon to take measures against unlawful contents. As a result the tripartite distinction between mere 
conduits, caching providers and hosting providers should be abandoned.  
 
3.1 The exemption of intermediary providers taking the initiative to regulate contents 
Because the drafters of the Directive on e-commerce have chosen to set the lowest common denominator as 
regards the liability regimes of Internet intermediaries by harmonizing a limited list of liability exemptions58, it 
is not easy to make sense of the European framework. Some have claimed that Maduro is wrong and the liability 
exemptions should protect Internet intermediaries that do issue judgements about the lawfulness of the contents 
transmitted or stored on their networks or systems59, even though freedom of expression remains a core value. 
This is certainly justified in some circumstances, in when administrators of forum or newsgroups are involved60. 
There is however a slight twist in the argumentation put forward, the assumption being that private regulation is 
less dangerous than public regulation when it comes to the defence of freedom of expression. Internet 
intermediaries should now be able to take the initiative to police their systems or networks without having to 
wait for a red flag61, be it after the reception of a detailed and substantiated notification or not. The Directive on  




 VAN EECKE, Online service providers and liability: a plea for a balanced approach. See also the position of the Advocate 
General Jääskinen in L’Oréal v eBay. Jääskinen’s opinion in L’Oréal v eBay §146: “As I have explained, ‘neutrality’ does 
not appear to be quite the right test under the directive for this question. Indeed, I would find it surreal that if eBay 
intervenes and guides the contents of listings in its system with various technical means, it would by that fact be deprived of 
the protection of Article 14 regarding storage of information uploaded by the users”. 
60
 Which is not always agreed with by national judges. See e.g.Cass, crim, 16 February 2010, 09-81.064 and 08-86.301. See 
nonetheless Decision n° 2011-164 QPC 16 September 2011. 
61
 This is the standard adopted in the United States when the hosting provider does not receive any notification. In the 
absence of notification the latter can only acquire knowledge of the infringing activity if the content at issue amounts to a red 
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e-commerce is thus deemed as embodying a twofold rationale: securing freedom of expression without hindering 
private regulation. Nonetheless the articulation and juxtaposition of both objectives is not a straightforward task.  
 
Truly, it is possible to view the provisions of the Directive on e-commerce from a different angle and state 
that the liability exemptions have been adopted not so much to promote the free flow of information but to make 
sure that intermediary providers do take the initiative to police their systems or networks. In other words 
lowering the cost of their activities through the means of favourable liability regimes could be seen as a way to 
give intermediary providers incentives to regulate the behaviour of their users. This trade-off certainly underlines 
the US CDA62 and to some extent the US DMCA63. To what extent the promotion of private regulation is really 
at the heart of the European legislative plan is more difficult to assess.  
 
Shifting from Recital 42 to Recital 40 of the Directive on e-commerce, one reads that “this Directive should 
constitute the appropriate basis for the development of rapid and reliable procedures for removing and disabling 
access to illegal information; (…) the provisions of this Directive relating to liability should not preclude the 
development and effective operation, by the different interested parties, of technical systems of protection and 
identification and of technical surveillance instruments made possible by digital technology within the limits laid 
down by Directives 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC”. As aforementioned, the foregoing is inferred from the premise that 
self-regulation, which may be better labelled private regulation64, operates more effectively within the digital 
world than public regulation65 and thereby should be encouraged.  
 
Here it is possible to take two different routes, the second one being more interventionist than the first one. 
Either one thinks that the invisible hand of the market for norms does adequately constrain Internet 
intermediaries to police their networks so that end users’ preferences do guide and determine the content of the 
offer made by intermediaries, or, one thinks that the market for norms is flawed almost per se and one needs to 
subject intermediaries to the hierarchically higher hand of the State which will guide their reactions more or less 
distantly. Because the drafters of the Directive on e-commerce do insist upon the need to make all interested 
parties collaborate together in order to set up self-help regulatory mechanisms, the European legislator does 
seem more wary of private regulation than the US one. In this sense the philosophy underlying the European 
legislation remains somewhat different from the one underlying the US statutes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
flag. Browsing the travaux préparatoirs one can read: “the bill imposes no obligation on a provider to seek out such red 
flags. Once a provider becomes aware of a red flag, however, it ceases to qualify for the exemption “. H.R. REP. 105-551(I), 
25. “Under this standard, a service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright infringement, but it would not 
qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to “red flags” of obvious infringement “. H.R. REP. 105-551(II), 57. 
For a comment see TODD E. REESE, Wading through the muddy waters: the courts' misapplication of section 512(c) of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 34 Southwestern University Law Review (2004);id. at;id. at;EDWARD LEE, Decoding the 
DMCA safe harbors, 32 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 233(2009). US courts have interpreted this standard 
restrictively. See e.g. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107-1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ; Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) ; Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 
1148-1149 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
62
 See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 2341 (4th Cir. 1997) and its progeniture 
Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ; Gentry v. eBay, Inc. 99 
Cal. App. 4th 816, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2002) ; Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) 
;  Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 146 P. 3d 510 (S. Ct. of Cal. 2006) ; Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 
F.Supp.2d 523, 536+ (D.Md. Feb 14, 2006). 
63
 See in fine CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) in which the implementation of filtering 
measures is not sufficient to infer knowledge of the infringing activities. 
64
 See e.g. SOPHIE STALLA-BOURDILLON, Chilling ISPs... When privqte regulators act without adequate public framework, 26 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 290(2010). For a definition of private regulation see COLIN SCOTT, Private 
regulation of the public sector: a neglected facet of contemporary governance, 29 Journal of Law and Society 56(2002). 
65
 As explained by Brousseau “[D]ue to the decreasing cost of information processing, and to the increasing capabilities of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and to the decentralized management of the Internet individual agents 
have access to capabilities that allow them to individually implement property rights  and to set-up self-enforcing collective 
rules at a much lower costs than before. Moreover, the efficiency and the credibility of traditional regulatory frames are 
challenged by digital technologies”. E. BROUSSEAU, Multilevel governance of the digital space: does a "second rank" 
institutional framework exist?  at http://www.brousseau.info., p. 5. See also E. BROUSSEAU, Régulation de l'Internet: 
l'autorégulation nécessite-t-elle un cadre institutionnel?  at http://www.brousseau.info. 
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    





One way of trying to bridge the gap between freedom of expression and private regulation in the field of 
copyright has been to argue in France that copyright infringements will in many instances appear manifestly 
given in particular the role of collective societies and the use of sworn agents whose reports constitute admissible  
evidence before French courts and tribunals66. This is the argument that has been put forward in the Report of the 
French Commission specialised on Internet providers67.  
 
When looking at the French Case law it does seem that several judges tend to consider that the reception of a 
complying notification68, which is not a sine qua non condition to prove actual knowledge69, is enough to 
establish that the alleged infringement is manifest70. This appears to be in contrast with the position of the 
Constitutional Council which when examining the conformity of the French statute with the constitutional 
principle of liability for negligence seemed to opine that the adjective manifest needed to be interpreted quite 
restrictively71. Furthermore, some Courts have been ready to rule that once a notification has been received the 
hosting provider has the duty to take down future uploading of identical contents without waiting for the 
reception of a notice72.  
 
It is questionable whether the reception of a detailed notice identifying an alleged infringement should 
automatically amount to the presumption that the content is manifestly unlawful. Senders of notice are not  
                                                          
66
 See Art. 332-1 of the French Code of Intellectual Property :”Apart from the reports drawn up by police investigators, the 
proof of the existence of any infringement of the provisions of Books I, II and III of this Code and of Article 52 of Act No. 85-
660 of July 3, 1985, on Authors’ Rights and on the Rights of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Videograms and 
Audiovisual Communication Enterprises may be provided by the statement of a sworn agent designated, as appropriate, by 
the National Center for Cinematography, by the professional bodies of authors or by the societies referred to in Title II of 
this Book. Such agents shall be approved by the Minister responsible for culture subject to the conditions laid down by a 
Conseil d'Etat decree”.   
67
 PIERRE SIRINELLI (PRESIDENT), Rapport de la Commission spécialisée sur les prestataire de l'Internet  at 
www.cspla.culture.gouv.fr/travauxcommissions.html., p. 66. The Commission specialised on Internet providers is a working 
group formed under the umbrella of the Superior Council of Literary and Artistic Property (le Conseil Supérieur de la 
propriété littéraire et artistique). This Council is an independent consultative body which is in charge of advising the 
government on matters related to literary and artistic property. 
68
 Under Aticle 6.I.5 of the Statute 2004-575 on confidence in the digital economy the notification shall contain the following 
information : date of notification, first name, last name, profession, domicile, nationality, date and place of birth of the right 
holder or if the latter is a legal person form, name, sit, representative organ; the description of the contentious facts and their 
precise localisation, the motives for their taking down ; copy of the exchanges between the right holder and the author or 
editor or justifications as to the reasons why the author or editor could not be contacted. The ″red tape″ and slowness of the 
notice procedure has been criticized by the drafters of the report. P. Sirinelli (président), Rapport de la Commission 
spécialisée sur les prestataires de l'Internet, 2008, www.cspla.culture.gouv.fr/travauxcommissions.html, p. 66. 
69
 The recent decision of the French Cassation Court seems to imply the contrary though. Cass, Civ 1, 17 February 2011, 
Nord-Ouest Production v Dailymotion, www.legalis.net 
70
 See for example TGI Paris, 3e ch., 1re section, 15 April 2008, Omar et Fred et autres v Dailymotion et autres, 
www.legalis.net. See also TGI Paris, 3e ch., 22 September 2009, n° 09/06246, ADAMI et a. v Sté YouTube, 
www.juriscom.net ; TGI Paris, réf., 16 June 2008, Société Paris Promotion v Société JFG Networks, SCI R. M. et Monsieur 
R. P., www.juriscom.net ; TGI Paris, 17e ch., 13 October 2008, Bachar K. et autre v Christophe B. et autres, 
www.juriscom.net ; TGI Paris, réf., 19 October 2006, Mme H. P. v SARL Google France et Sté Google Inc., Juris-Data nº 
06/58312, http://www.foruminternet.org./ See also Cass, Civ 1, 17 February 2011, Nord-Ouest Production v Dailymotion, 
www.legalis.net in fine. 
71
 Décision nº 2004-496 DC, 10 juin 2004, JORF nº 135 du 22.06.2004, p. 11182, Considérant 9 in fine. See LIONEL 
THOUMYRE, Les hébergeurs en ombres chinoises - Une tentative d'éclaircissement sur les incertitudes de la LCEN, 5 Revue 
Lamy Droit de l'Immatériel n.58(2005). 
72
 See e.g. TGI Paris, 19 October 2007, SARL Zadig Production, Jean-Robert V. et Mathieu V. v Sté Google Inc. et AFA, 
http://juriscom.net/ ;TGI Paris, réf., 19 November 2008, Jean Yves L. dit Lafesse et autres v Dailymotion, www.legalis.net; 
TGI Paris, 3e ch., 2e section, 14 November 2008, Jean Yves L. et autres v Youtube et autres, www.legalis.net; TGI Paris, réf, 
5 March 2009, Roland Magdane et autres v YouTube, www.legalis.net; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 2e section, 10 April 2009, SARL 
Zadig Productions v SA Dailymotion, www.legalis.net; TGI Paris, 3e ch., 2e section, H & K, André R. v Google , 9 October 
2009, http://www.legalis.net./ For a recent contrary decision see TGI Paris, 3e ch., 4e sect., 28 April. 2011, SPPF v Youtube, 
Google France, Google Ireland : http://www.legalis.net./ (the reason why the tribunal refuses to go that far in this case is 
because the right holders had not cooperated with the service provider). The question remains whether hosting providers have 
the obligation to stop identical infringements that are present on the systems of the service provider but that have not been 
spotted by right holders.  
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required to use the services of agents specifically trained to identify copyright infringement. Although it has been 
argued that notice (and take down) procedures have been put into place primarily to deal with the problems 
raised by unlawful file sharing (which imply the entire reproduction of identical protected works without prior 
authorization)73, this restriction has not been built within the legislative frameworks that have been adopted for 
that purpose and notices can thus be sent to denounce a variety of infringing activities. More generally, the 
presumption of innocence is simply undermined if technological sanctions automatically follow: the right-holder 
commissioning the agent may be wrong. In an interesting decision a US court acknowledged in this line that a 
copyright owner shall consider the implications of fair use in formulating a good faith belief that use of the 
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law as required 
by the DMCA. According to the Court  
 
“[u]ndoubtedly, some evaluations of fair use will be more complicated than others. But in the 
majority of cases, a consideration of fair use prior to issuing a takedown notice will not be so 
complicated as to jeopardize a copyright owner's ability to respond rapidly to potential 
infringements”. 
 
The policing of one’s network or system can be done at the initiative of the Internet intermediary even before 
the manifestation of victims. The advocates of private regulation have thus argued that if Internet intermediaries 
chose this path, this should not entail the impossibility to avail of liability exemptions. Such a solution has been 
adopted outside the field of intellectual property in the US in the wake of the Zeran decision74 dealing with 
defamation. It has also been adopted in the same country in the field of intellectual property and in particular 
copyright. Indeed the US legislator has laid down general Good Samaritans immunities to be applicable when 
Internet intermediaries, whatever their activities, restrict or block access to unlawful contents. Hosting providers 
and providers of location tools can thus claim the benefit of the safe harbours laid down in the DMCA even 
though they take the initiative to police their systems or networks in the absence of notification75, while they 
have the obligation to automatically react76 upon complying notifications. As regards trademarks, courts have 
adopted similar solutions even though no safe harbour has been specifically designed for the digital world77.  
 
In Europe, commentators have expressed the view that the combination of both private regulation and the 
protection of freedom of expression is a better strategy than simply trying to secure freedom of expression78. 
They argue that a more balanced approach than the approach apparently taken in the Google v Vuitton case is  
                                                          
73
 This is the case in the US. See JENNIFER M. URBAN & LAURA QUILTER, Efficient process of "chilling effects"? 
Takedown notices under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa Clara Computer and High 
Technology Law Journal 621(2006).  
74
 See supra fn 60.  
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 Hendrickson v. Ebay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001); ALS Scan Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 
239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) : “The liability-limiting provision applicable here, 17 U.S.C. §512(c), gives Internet 
service providers a safe harbor from liability for “infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a 
user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider” as long as the 
service provider can show that: (1) it has neither actual knowledge that its system contains infringing materials nor an 
awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringement is apparent, or it has expeditiously removed or disabled access 
to infringing material upon obtaining actual knowledge of infringement; (2) it receives no financial benefit directly 
attributable to infringing activity; and (3) it responded expeditiously to remove or disable access to material claimed to be 
infringing after receiving from the copyright holder a notification conforming with requirements of §512(c)(3). Id. 
§512(c)(1). Thus, to qualify for this safe harbor protection, the Internet service provider must demonstrate that it has met all 
three of the safe harbor requirements, and a showing under the first prong-the lack of actual or constructive knowledge-is 
prior to and separate from the showings that must be made under the second and third prongs”. 
77
 See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc. 576 F.Supp.2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) affirmed in part by 600 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir.(N.Y.) 
Apr 01, 2010) on Remand to 2010 WL 3733894 (S.D.N.Y. Sep 13, 2010) and certiorari denied by 131 S.Ct. 647 (U.S. Nov 
29, 2010). The solutions adopted in the field of trademark are very similar to that of adopted in the field of copyright. 
Compare the Tiffany decisions with the following one Viacom v Youtube 718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y., 2010).  
78
 VAN EECKE, Online service providers and liability: a plea for a balanced approach. 
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needed in the same line as the solutions adopted in the United States. Thus, it would be still missing at the 
European level an exemption of liability in case of bona fine reaction against lawful contents. 
 
Although such an approach could seem to better reflect the European regulatory tradition than that of the US 
in so far as it implies that freedom of expression is not an overriding value and must be balanced against other 
competing interests79, it does not avoid all criticisms. Private regulators as well as public regulators are capable 
of chilling free speech80. Moreover, even though Internet intermediaries are very deferential to alleged victims 
and do automatically take down or restrict contents that are precisely identified and localised in complying 
notification, the inclusion of a provision sanctioning any person who knowingly materially misrepresents that 
material or activity is infringing81 does not guarantee the inexistence of adverse effect upon lawful contents82. 
This has been denounced by commentators in the United States since the adoption of the CDA and the DMCA. 
 
To make sure content regulation is fully effective active Internet intermediaries but also passive 
intermediaries should be called upon.  
3.2 The burdening of passive intermediaries  
In Europe, specific rules dealing with the role of Internet intermediaries in case of online copyright infringement 
have been adopted on top of the horizontal provisions of the Directive on e-commerce. Even though these rules 
have not originally been conceived as exceptions to the more general rules set forth in the Directive their 
interpretation and implementation both at European and national levels are likely to undermine the tripartite 
distinction drawn between mere conduits, caching providers and hosting providers. 
 
The Directive on enforcement specifies that interlocutory and permanent injunctions can be issued against 
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe intellectual property rights83. The Directive 
does not expressly define who qualifies as an intermediary. This should be welcomed at least for two reasons. 
First it is simply vain to try to set precisely the contours of the category of Internet intermediaries given the 
speed at which digital technology evolves. Second, because it is artificial to try to distinguish between passive 
and active intermediaries: passive as well as active intermediaries have potentially regulatory capabilities.  
 
The Directive on enforcement echoes the infosoc Directive which already contained a provision on remedies 





                                                          
79
 SOPHIE STALLA-BOURDILLON, The flip side of ISP's liability regimes: the ambiguous protection of fundamental rights and 
liberties in private digital spaces, 26 Computer law & Security Review 492(2010);JOEL R. REIDENBERG, Yahoo and 
democracy on the Internet, 42 Jurimetrics 261(2002). 
80
 See e.g. DAWN C. NUNZIATO, Freedom of expression, democratic norms, and internet governance, 52 Emory Law Journal 
187(2003);DAWN C. NUNZIATO, The death of the public forum in cyberspace, 20 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
1115(2005). 
81
 17 U.S.C. §512(f). For a judicial interpretation see Ondine Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc. 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1197 (N.D. 
Cal 2004) ; Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) and Biosafe-One, Inc. v. 
Hawks, 524 F.Supp.2d 452, 468-469 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). See also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1154+ 
(N.D.Cal. 2008).  For a similar provision in French law see Statute 2004-575 for confidence in the digital economy, Article 
6.I.4.  
82
 JENNIFER M. URBAN & LAURA QUILTER, Efficient process or "chilling effects"? Takedown notices under section 512 of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act -- Summary Report  at http://www.chillingeffects.org/; URBAN & QUILTER, Efficient 
process of "chilling effects"? Takedown notices under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See also Rossi v. 
Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004) in which a DMCA's notice had been used to induce an ISP 
to take down a website from which illegal content could not be downloaded; Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. 
Supp. 2d 1195, 1204-05 (N.D. Cal. 2004) in which DMCA notice had been used to induce ISPs to take down websites 
protected fair use. 
83
 Article 9 and 11.  
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against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe copyright or related rights84 . The 
Directive on enforcement goes nonetheless further than the infosoc Directive in the sense that it provides for a 
right of information that can be asserted before a competent judicial authority against any person who was found 
to be providing on a commercial scale services used in infringing activities85 .  
 
In LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH v Tele2 Telecommunication 
GmbH (LSG v Tele2)86 the CJEU had to construe the term intermediary within the meaning of the infosoc 
Directive87. One argument of the defendant, being an Internet access provider, was that to qualify for an 
intermediary within the meaning of the Directive the service provider would need to be able to effectively bring 
copyright infringement to an end, which would not have been possible for the defendant in that case. The CJUE 
did not agree with the latter and held that the category of intermediaries encompasses any service provider which 
“carries a third party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject-matter in a network”. Because “It is 
common ground that access providers, in granting access to the Internet, make it possible for such unauthorised 
material to be transmitted between a subscriber to that service and a third party” 88, Internet access providers 
fall within that category. No further consideration was needed. As a result “access providers which merely 
provide users with Internet access, without offering other services such as email, FTP or file‑ sharing services 
or exercising any control, whether de iure or de facto, over the services which users make use of, must be 
regarded as ‘intermediaries’ within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29” 89. In other words, the 
neutrality or passiveness of the service provider is irrelevant. Mere conduits are intermediaries as well as user 
generated content platforms even though the former cannot be held financially liable under Article 12 of the 
Directive on e-commerce.  
 
At the national level Courts have also supported a broad interpretation. In the UK, the High Court ruled 
similarly in Newzbin 2 that because users could access the infringing website through the means of the service of 
the defendant providing Internet access to part of them, the defendant’s services were used to infringe. Although 
the Court did consider that users downloading infringing materials through the means supplied by the infringing 
website were infringers90, it was sufficient to find that the infringing website was violating the right to 
communicate the protected work to the public for the purpose of determining whether the defendant’s services 
had been used to infringe91. Said otherwise even though end users might benefit from an exception to copyright, 
the fact that the defendant’s service allows the infringing website to reach the public is enough for the defendant 
to be deemed an intermediary. 
 
Even though the infosoc Directive and the Directive on enforcement go further than the Directive on e-
commerce in the sense that they make it an obligation for Member States to allow right holders to claim for 
injunction against intermediaries, Member States retain some leeway. Recital 59 of the infosoc Directive states 
that the “conditions and modalities relating to such injunctions should be left to the national law of Member 
States”. Some Member States have not chosen to identically reproduce the words of the infosoc Directive, as it 
is the case with the UK. Indeed, the UK has chosen in section 97A of CDPA 198892 to impose the condition that 
the service provider “has actual knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright”. In 
Newzbin 2 the question was whether the expression actual knowledge for the purpose of Article 97A of the 
CDPA was to be given the same meaning as the expression actual knowledge used to describe the obligations of  
 
 
                                                          
84
 Article 8(3).  
85
 Article 8.  
86
 [2009] ECR I-1227 
87
 And in particular Article 5(1)(a) and Article 8(3).  
88
 LSG v Tele2, § 44. 
89
 LSG v Tele2, § 46. 
90
 Newzbin 2, § 108. 
91
 Newzbin 2 § 113. 
92
 It is interesting to note that the UK has specifically transposed Article 8(3) of the infosoc Directive but not Article 11 of the 
Enforcement Directive.  
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hosting providers in Regulation 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 200293. Mere general 
knowledge of one or more persons using one’s service to infringe copyright was deemed to be sufficient by the 
Court. It was thus not necessary for the claimant to prove actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement94.  
 
The main problem with this approach is that Internet access providers will immediately react upon 
notifications of right holders without waiting for any judicial or administrative order. This thus in part 
undermines or at least reduces the interest of the absolute exemption of liability designed for mere conduits. 95 
 
In the end, despite the ambiguities of the recent decision of the CJEU the second rationale consisting in 
encouraging or better forcing the development of private regulation seems more widely shared than the first one. 
This is certainly the case in the field of intellectual property. To what extent this is also true in other sectors is 
less clear and in particular when consumers’ interests are at stake rather than right holders’ interests. The shifting 
of the focus from the protection of freedom of expression to the promotion of self-regulation which does 
necessarily imply the organization into a hierarchy of different competing interests has been eased by the 
lessening in importance of the third rationale: the furtherance of innovation in the digital world.  
4. The third rationale: subsidizing intermediary providers 
The third rationale that motivated the drafters of the Directive on e-commerce to react is the need to subsidize 
Internet and online service providers responsible for the growth of the digital economy. This is not the first time 
that liability rules have been used to favour the interests of industrial actors as the US example shows it with the 
maturation of the tort of negligence at the end of the nineteenth century. The implications of such a regulatory 
strategy seem obvious: to avoid making intermediary providers bear the costs of content regulation so that they 
are not prevented from developing innovative applications and thereby to be suspicious of broad court orders 
requiring intermediary providers to set up far-reaching surveillance mechanisms.  
 
4.1 The prohibition to make intermediary providers bear the costs of monitoring measures 
On top of claiming that Internet intermediaries who take the initiative to police their networks should still benefit 
from the liability exemptions laid down in the Directive on e-commerce, commentators usually add that these 
intermediaries should not bear the costs of monitoring96 their systems of networks. Here it is crucial to correctly 
identify the overriding rationale. The latter is advocated to make sure that innovation more than freedom of 
expression is not chilled: saying that no general monitoring obligation should burden Internet intermediaries is 
simply saying that they should not bear the costs of such activities and not that they should not undertake these 
activities at all97.  
 
                                                          
93
 SI 2002/2013 (“The 2002 Regulations”). Regulation 22 of the 2002 Regulations provides that: in determining whether a 
service provider has actual knowledge a court shall take into account in particular whether a service provider has received a 
notice which includes among other things details of the location of the information in question and details of the unlawful 
nature of the activity or information in question.  
94
 Newzbin 2, §148. 
95
 Hendrickson v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 298 F.Supp.2d 914, 917 (C.D.Cal. 2003): “if at the time the notice is received, the 
infringing material is not posted, the notice does not enable the service provider to locate infringing material that is not 
there, let alone do it expeditiously”.  Therefore the claimant’s notice could not be deemed adequate notice for subsequent 
listings and sales dealing with the infringing item. See also §512(j)(1) which were adopted to restrict the pre-existing 
solutions adopted on the ground of contributory or vicarious liability.  
96
 Understood broadly.  
97
 Maduro does nonetheless link the prohibition of a general obligation to monitor one’s systems or networks to the rationale 
of securing freedom of expression: “I construe Article 15 of that directive not merely as imposing a negative obligation on 
Member States, but as the very expression of the principle that service providers which seek to benefit from a liability 
exemption should remain neutral as regards the information they carry or host”. Maduro’s opinion in Google v Vuitton, § 
143. This may be because his understanding of the remit of a monitoring obligation does encompass standard-setting.
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This preoccupation was certainly high in the agenda of the drafters of the Directive on e-commerce as in the 
agenda of the drafters of the DMCA98 who discussing policy issues in the mid-nineties were legitimately 
concerned about the creation and expansion of the digital market. This is the main reason why Article 15 
expressly provides that “Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the 
services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a 
general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity”. It is interesting to note that 
the language of the DMCA is though slightly different99: if standard technical measures are used by right-holders 
Internet intermediaries can be constrained to monitor their services or networks. The notion of standard technical 
measures is however quite restrictive: “technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or 
protect copyrighted works and (A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and 
service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process; (B) are available to any person 
on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or 
substantial burdens on their systems or networks”100. 
 
The exclusion of a general monitoring obligation does not prevent Member States from imposing limited 
monitoring obligation and paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Directive on e-commerce gives an example of the 
type of limited monitoring obligation that is acceptable: “Member States may establish obligations for 
information society service providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal 
activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the 
competent authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their service with 
whom they have storage agreements”101. It is important to acknowledge here that the limited monitoring 
obligation does not entail an obligation to implement enforcement measures and thereby take down or restrict 
access to allegedly unlawful content. 
 
Assuming one seeks to make sure that Internet intermediaries do not bear monitoring expenses the focus 
should only be upon the costs of setting up technological measures that would enable them to monitor their 
networks or systems in practice. In cases where it would be possible to put into place a reimbursement system 
that would be effective then in principle the prohibition of Article 15 should not step in. This is clearly the 
approach taken by the French Tribunal in the case Claude Guéant v Free et al which rejected the blocking by 
URL on the ground that it would be too costly for Internet access providers but which ordered the blocking of 
the entire website on the condition that the claimant reimburses the expenses incurred by the Internet access 
providers to comply with the order.  
 
In other jurisdictions, the notion of monitoring has been interpreted quite narrowly. This is the case in the 
UK: in the words of Kenneth Parker J. “[a] “general” obligation refers to a systematic arrangement whereby the 
putative “monitor” is inspecting or examining information randomly or by reference to particular classes of 
information or subscribers, and is not focusing on a specific instance that has for apparently good reason been 
brought to its attention”102. As a result the Digital Economy Act does not impose upon Internet access providers 
any monitoring obligations. This is also the case in Ireland: in the words of Charleton J.: “[d]eep packet 
inspection, (…) is not the seeking of information which is the course of transmission. Instead, it identifies the  
 
 
                                                          
98
 Edwards, Articles 12-15 ECD: ISP Liability -The Problem of Intermediary Service Provider Liability.   Edwards, The fall 
and rise of intermediary liability online.   
99
 See 17 U.S.C. §512(m) : “Protection of privacy.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability 
of subsection (a) through (d) on – (1) a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating 
infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying with provisions of subsection 
(i); or (2) a service provider gaining access to, removing, or disabling access to material in cases in which such conduct is 
prohibited by law”. 
100
 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(2). 
101
 For a similar provision under French law see Statute 2004-575, Art. 6.I.7. 
102
 R, on the application of British Telecommunications Plc and another v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & 
Skills and others (Open Rights Group and another, intervening) [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin) (BT v Secretary of State for 
Business), §114. 
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nature of transmissions, whether encrypted or otherwise, by reference to the ports which they use, and the 
protocol employed, as to as to identify peer-to-peer communication”103. 
 
It goes without saying that other significant interests are likely to be impaired if Internet intermediaries are 
required to set up surveillance mechanisms and in particular privacy interests since IP addresses are now 
officially considered to be protected personal data104. The CJEU in Scarlet v Sabam does also mention the fact 
that the imposition of an obligation to monitor through the means of an injunction could potentially undermine 
freedom of expression but here it is more the enforcement measure taken as a consequence of the monitoring that 
is potentially problematic: an “injunction could potentially undermine freedom of information since that system 
might not distinguish adequately between unlawful content and lawful content, with the result that its 
introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful communications”105. 
 
Generally speaking each time monitoring costs have been deemed to be appropriately shared between 
Internet intermediaries and right holders the former have been burdened with additional monitoring obligations, 
which do not always imply the appreciation of the lawfulness of the contentious activities on the part of Internet 
intermediaries. The creation of the French authority “la Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Œuvres et la 
Protection des Droits sur Internet”106 and the enactment of the Digital Economy Act bear witnesses to this trend. 
The sharing of costs among Internet intermediaries and right holders have not be done in the same way in the 
UK and in France though. While the expenses to implement the graduated response still entirely rely upon 
Internet access providers in France, right holders in the UK have been initially required to bear twenty five per 
cent of the expenditures. Truly, the High Court recently held that that the “qualifying costs” imposed on Internet 
access providers in respect of the costs incurred by the Office of Communications (Ofcom) or the appeals body 
in carrying out functions under the copyright infringement provisions including costs incurred in appointing the 
appeals body or in establishing a body corporate to be the appeals body were tantamount to “administrative 
charges” within the meaning of the Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC107 and were therefore unlawful108. 
Besides, when it finally appeared that these ad hoc regulatory schemes were doomed to require vain efforts 
because of the evolution of Internet users’ practices, sometimes even before the full implementation of the new 
legal framework, right holders themselves and public authorities have searched for alternative ways to implicate 
Internet intermediaries and in particular means to ease the blocking of entire websites alleged to be infringing109.  
 
The prohibition to make intermediary providers bear the costs of monitoring measures restrict the power of 
judges to grant broad injunctions against these facilitators.  
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 EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd and Others v UPC Communications Ireland Ltd, [2010] IEHC 377, §107.  
104
 CJEU, 24 November 2011, C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL 
(SABAM) (Scarlet v Sabam), §51. The position of the Advocate General Cruz Villalon seems to be more critique of the 
measure ordered by the national judged. See Conclusions de l’Avocat General M. Pedro Cruz Villalon présentées le 14 avril 
2011, C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), §69.  
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 Scarlet v Sabam, §52. Cruz Villalon is in the same line. See §85 in which he insists upon the adverse effect of blocking 
lawful contents.  
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 See Statute nº 2009-669 du 12 June 2009 favouring the diffusion and protection of creation on the Internet JORF, nº 135, 
13/06/2009,  p. 9666. Decision nº 2009-580 DC 10 June 2009, JORF nº 135 du 13.06.2009, p. 9675. Statute nº 2009-1311 28 
October 2009 on the criminal protection of literary and artistic property on the Internet, JORF nº 251, 29/10/2009, p. 18290. 
Decision nº 2009-590 22 October 2009, JORF nº 251, 29/10/2009, p 1892.  
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 Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21–32, Art. 12. 
108
 BT v Secretary of State for Business. 
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 On the 25/11/2011 the Hadopi decided to explore other routes of to protect copyright holders and in particular to react 
upon streaming and direct downloading of infringing materials. See the press release 
http://www.google.com/search?q=mission+hadopi+&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-
GB:official&client=firefox-a. In the UK the culture minister recently stated that measures targeting search engines and social 
networks could be introduced in the upcoming new Communications Act, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
15390021./  
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    




4.2 The suspicions towards broad injunctions 
Continuing on this path, law-makers should be wary of broad injunctions ordering their addressees to implement 
costly technological measures to terminate present infringement and prevent future infringement. While national 
judges have some difficulties to take into account the ex ante effect of injunctions110 , they have not always 
taken seriously into account the resulting financial burden imposed upon Internet intermediaries and in particular 
Internet access providers. 
 
 Article 12, 13 and 14 of the Directive on e-commerce do recognize the possibility for Member States to 
require service providers to terminate or prevent unlawful activities. This provision does imply that competent 
national authorities should be able to order service providers to take measures to preclude their users to transmit 
or make available unlawful contents in the future. Clearly Article 12, 13, 14 must be read together with Article 
15. But if here the main concern is the costs that the service provider would have to face had the injunction been 




 The crucial issue is however how much Internet intermediaries must spend to make the judicial order 
effective.  
 
The CJEU insisting in Scarlet v Sabam upon the freedom to conduct one’s business considered that it is not 
possible to impose upon Internet intermediaries monitoring obligations that would constitute a serious obstacle 
to the conduct of their businesses. Thus said, Scarlet v Sabam is an easy case in so far as the injunction claimed 
for would if granted have a significant economic impact upon the defendant since it would require the 
installation of complicated and costly permanent computer system at the sole expenses of the Internet access 
provider. Indeed, the injunction would require the monitoring of all electronic communications made through the 
network of the service provider concerned with no limitation in time and would need to be directed to all 
possible future copyright infringements. This echoes the position taken by the CJEU in the earlier case L’Oréal v 
eBay: “the measures required of the online service provider concerned cannot consist in an active monitoring of 
all the data of each of its customers in order to prevent any future infringement of intellectual property rights via 
that provider’s website”112. Because in Scarlet v Sabam the CJEU was only concerned about the outer limits of 
Article 15, it is likely that reasonable monitoring obligations in terms of costs will be welcomed without many 
difficulties.  
 
Stressing the need to further legal certainty and to protect the legitimate expectations of the addressees of 
injunctions113 Advocate General Jääskinen in L’Oréal v eBay opined that “[a]n appropriate limit for the scope of 
injunctions may that of a double requirement of identity. This means that the infringing third party should be the  
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 The most topical case is the Sabam case. See SCRL Société belge des auteurs (SABAM) v SA Scarlet, Tribunal de 
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same in the cases concerned. Hence, an injunction could be given against an intermediary to prevent the 
continuation or repetition of an infringement of a certain trade mark by a certain user”114. At the same time the 
fact that the infringer is not identified should not be a bar to the grant of an injunction according to the Advocate 
General115. However, arguing that injunctions targeting future IP infringements should be limited to situations of 
double identity, i.e. to identical or similar infringements committed by identical infringers implies that one is not 
only worried by the costs of the remedy but also by the chilling effect of the remedy upon freedom of expression. 
In other words limiting the scope of injunctions to situations of double identity is a means to make sure service 
providers do not attempt to appreciate the lawfulness of the contents transmitted on their network.  
 
At the national level judges have not adhered to the rule of double identity116. Truly it could be argued that 
only one identity is sufficient to make sure Internet intermediaries do not substitute judges: identity of 
infringements rather than identify of infringers. At national level, judges seem to focus more upon the feasibility 
of the measure required rather than upon its potential chilling effect upon freedom of expression. Besides they 
appear to start from the premise that Internet intermediaries should bear at least part of the monitoring costs. In 
the UK case Newzbin 2117, the High Court granted an injunction against the major UK Internet access providers 
ordering it to implement a technical solution118 that it already employed for different purposes in order to prevent 
its services from being used by users and operators of the infringing website to infringe copyright. Noticeably 
the scope of the injunction granted goes beyond identity of infringement and does encompass the protection of 
third party rights. Although the Court does acknowledge that the order would potentially prevent the defendant’s 
subscribers from making use of the infringing website for non-infringing purposes, on the evidence the incidence 
of such use was de minimis. The Court was thus ready to extent the scope of the injunction to benefit third 
parties having received evidence that third party rights were indeed being infringed and that third party right 
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While the need to subsidize the ICT industry had been felt strongly at the time of the adoption of the 
Directive on e-commerce in order to make sure that the European Union could compete with the United States, 
the appearances and expansion of several successful business models perceived as free riding upon the interests 
of IP right holders and in particular copyright holders have contributed towards the alteration of the initial 
perception of law-makers, be it the legislative or the judiciary. As a result although some doubts persists at the 
European level encouraging and or even forcing private regulation has become the majoritarian motto.  
5. Conclusion 
Contrary to what one could have thought at first glance, the Directive on e-commerce is a complex legislative 
instrument. This is the case not so much because of the technicality or others would say vagueness of its 
provisions dealing with intermediary providers, which are in terms of length quite limited but because of the 
plurality and diversity of the interests at stake. The study of the implications and the interactions of the different 
rationale that underline the system of liability exemptions laid down in favour of Internet intermediaries at the 
European level shows that it is indeed difficult to pursue all of them together without making harsh 
compromises: the encouragement of private regulation impacts upon the strength of freedom of expression in the 
digital world as well as upon the propensity to innovate. This explains why national solutions are not always 
consistent both within one Member State and among several Member States.  
 
It may well be true that the distinction between neutral or passive and active Internet intermediaries make 
little sense because even the weakest link has some potential regulatory capacities and that giving intermediaries 
incentives to remain neutral is a desire doomed to remain an illusion because of economic interests and above all 
the human presence behind the technology. This said, they are ways to interpret the liability exemptions in a 
sense that does enhance the level of freedom of expression.  
 
In addition, it is crucial to understand the upshot of the autonomisation of liability regimes in relation to the 
nature of the remedy claimed for. In other words even if the distinction between damages and injunction can 
seem to be a sound legal distinction, in cases in which injunctions are costly to implement they will have the 
same ex ante effect as the award of damages: the imposition of an obligation to regulate the behaviour of one’s 
subscribers or users before any judicial intervention, which is likely to be undertaken at the expense of freedom 
of expression.   
 
In spite of the increasing attention of national judges refusing in several cases to make Internet intermediaries 
pay damages to victims for the transmission or storage of contents at the request of third parties, the 
encouragement and even more the forcing of private regulation has progressively become the prevailing 
rationale. Furthermore it has been pursued either without convincingly limiting the domain of private regulation 
in relation to the type of IP infringement activities or without laying down satisfactory safeguards for the respect 
of due process. As a result it is legitimate to argue that the balance stricken between all the interests at stake in 
the fight against online piracy is to some extent flawed in so far as the protection of freedom of expression but 
also the promotion of innovation are in some cases jeopardized without much gain on the side of IP rights 
enforcement. But before one tries to adopt a more balanced approach it is essential to clearly highlight the terms 
of the quid pro quo between freedom of expression, freedom to trade, privacy right and property right. 
 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
 
